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Reports 3

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2685

17 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed DCID No. 5/6

Attached is a comment on the proposed DCID No. 5/6,
prepared by a member of my staff who is interested in the
subject. The comments are his own and are forwarded for
such use and interest as they may have.

[Redacted Signature]

Donald F. Chamberlain
Inspector General

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Attachment a/s

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16 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Breckinridge

SUBJECT : Proposed DCID No. 5/6 (USIB-D-⁹3/11, 11 July 1975)

1. I recommend that USIB consider including a policy on the control and release of information on international intelligence exchanges and cooperation in addition to the question of classification addressed in the subject draft DCID.

2. There is the possibility (and I believe the practice) of a sharing of classified information concerning U.S. intelligence capabilities, activities and relationships with foreign members of international military staffs (such as SACEUR and SACLANT staffs) and the incorporation of such information in combined staff planning documents when the control, NO FOREIGN DISSEM is not specifically applied. This point came up in negotiations with the JCS last year on the revision of the CIA-JCS Command Relationships Agreement where CIA assumed that information on their activities would not be released to foreign officers without their permission and JCS assumed that such information could be incorporated into NATO planning unless specifically prohibited by a NO FOREIGN DISSEM control. This may seem to be a theoretical, rather than an actual problem, but information provided to U.S. members of an international military staff can be shared with the foreign members of that staff unless proscribed.

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3. This concern is not on release of information on foreign intelligence liaison, per se, but on inadvertent release of sensitive information due to interdepartmental misunderstandings. This DCID could be amplified to preclude any misunderstanding.

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